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Abstract
It is well recognised that the issue of the social rate of discount applies only to the gains from
public investment that accrues to the public sector. When it comes to measurement, however,
there is a problem: public investment in infrastructure and the like do not usually yield direct
pecuniary returns to the public exchequer. Instead public capital may be plausibly argued to
lead to increases in factor productivity in the private economy. This paper observes that
government typically shares in the latter gains via the collection of tax revenues. Hence to the
extent the risk discount rate should reflect the co-variability between the return from public
investment and that of the market, we are led to measuring the risk premium implicit in
various revenue flows. We apply the above methodology to the United States budget data for
the period, 1950-2000, and show that the social risk premium is relatively small vis-à-vis the
market. Consequently, the use of the risk free rate as the correct risk discount rate for public
sector investment would involve only a minor error. The intuition here is that the portfolio of
assets embedded in the state’s revenue claims provides additional diversification than is
available through financial markets. Therefore, even investors holding well-diversified stock
portfolios may legitimately view claims on state revenue as vehicles for further risk shifting.
Keywords: public discount rate, risk premium, aggregate risks, correlated risks, public
investment.
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What should be the appropriate risk discount rate for the public sector investment, say in 
infrastructure? The risk-free rate or the rate faced by the corporate sector? There are several distinct 
answers in the literature. Hirshleifer (1964, 1966) and Sandmo (1972) argue in favour of one rate for 
both sectors, where the actual rate would depend on the risk class the investment belongs to; “for 
each type of public investment, it is possible to find a private industry such that returns are highly 
correlated” (Sandmo, 1972, p287)
2. In a critique of the Hirshleifer position, Samuelson (1964) and 
Vickrey (1964), look upon the government as primarily a device for mutual reinsurance. To quote 
Samuelson, “...General Motors can borrow at a lower rate than American Motors because it is a 
pooler of more independent risks…The same holds for We, Inc., which is a better pooler than even 
GM...” (p96). Both Samuelson (1964) and Vickrey (1964) argue for the risk free rate. The return on 
human capital risk, which is believed to be largely idiosyncratic, is often pointed out as a case in 
point [Eaton and Rosen, (1980a, b) and Varian (1980)]. Consequently, by taxing labour income 
the government may pool across the latter risk, and improve on the market allocation. Thus, as 
we argue below, the overall market value of revenue may well depend on the mix of available 
revenue sources. 
Arrow-Lind (1970) also recommended the risk-free rate. They however distinguish between two 
cases, both related to the framework chosen by Hirshleifer and further elaborated upon by Sandmo. 
First, Arrow-Lind point out that Hirshleifer is mostly correct in the sense that even if the 
government is able to pool better, cheap public borrowing deprives the private sector of investments, 
which are of greater market value (crowding out). However, if the marginal project had returns that 
did not correlate with past project returns (i.e., the existing portfolio), any investor (public or private) 
is entitled to the risk-free rate in a perfect markets setting. Thus the Arrow-Lind focus happens to be 
in a scenario where the public sector investment yields benefits, which do not correlate well with the 
current portfolio of investments, public or private.
3 The second case proposed by Arrow-Lind is 
based on the risk-spreading concept. To the extent the benefits of public investment accrue to the 
public sector, which is also paid for by the government (say, via taxes), “a public investment can be 
considered as an investment in which each individual taxpayer has a very small share” (p370). 
                                                 
1 Earlier versions of the paper have been presented at economics faculty workshops at the Chinese University of 
Hong Kong, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU, Copenhagen), Helsinki, Frankfurt, Korean Institute of Public 
Finance, New Hampshire, Norwegian Business School, Uppsala and Wuerzburg. The authors gratefully 
acknowledge the hospitality at EPRU, and the helpful comments made by seminar participants, especially, Jonas 
Agell, Craig Brett, Niels Blomgren-Hansen, Katherine Cuff, Gordon Fisher, Jim Hines, Mike Hoy, Erkki Koskela, 
Andy Kwan, Carla Marchese, Soeren Nielsen, Agnar Sandmo, Hans-Werner Sinn and Jay Wilson. 
2 Similarly, in later writings concerns have been voiced that tax revenue risks were just as costly for the state to bear 
as for private agents [Gordon (1985) and Hamilton (1987)]. Bulow and Summers (1984) indeed have gone the 
farthest, and have argued that corporate tax revenue resembles capital gains in terms of the underlying risk, and 
correspondingly, relying on this revenue, "..[Government] can only finance programs whose budgets may have a 
certainty equivalent of zero", p21). 
3 Pauly  (1970) however believed, much along the Hirshleifer-Sandmo position, that there was little reason to 
suppose that public investment would be any less correlated with the aggregate risk than private investment of 
“equal term” (p196).     2 
Consequently, “the government distributes the risk associated with any investment among a very 
large number of people.... It is the risk-spreading aspect that is essential to the result” (p366). Here 
again the derivation of the risk free discount rate requires the independence assumption. To sum up 
then, the second Arrow-Lind result in support of the risk free rate as the social discount rate is based 
on the state being able to apportion the risk of each uncorrelated project among a large number of 
risk sharers.
4 
Importantly, one common hypothesis that is crucial for the correctness of the risk free rate as the 
social discount rate is the mutual independence of investment returns. How plausible is this? Arrow-
Lind themselves raised the concern: “if there is positive correlation between the returns of an 
investment and other components of national income, the question remains whether this correlation 
is so high as to invalidate the previous result” (p373). Sandmo also wondered on the relevance of an 
ideal stock market (for each state-time contingencies) and real world markets: “How close the 
approximation may be is of course an empirical question…”(p 296).  
The present paper develops a framework to measure the closeness of the returns from public 
investment with the other components of GDP, and thereby provide an empirical answer to the 
above debate. We note that neither group of authors actually dwells on how one may be able to 
empirically verify the issue at hand. Clearly one would first require an observable equivalent of the 
benefits of public investment. Arrow and Lind make the important point that benefits of public 
investment may in general accrue both to private agents (e.g., farmers gaining from public 
investment in irrigation) and to the government. The former would be valued by private individuals 
“with respect to both time and risk in accordance with the preferences of the individuals to whom 
they accrue” (p377). The social discount rate therefore applies only to the portion of benefits that 
accrues to the government. In their exact formulation, however, the government actually “captures 
all benefits and pay all costs” (p370), since private individuals who gain from the investment are 
presumed to pass on the benefit to the treasury in entirety.  
Our first observation is that the above description hints at how one may go about measuring the 
public gains from public investment. The most direct manner we know how “the beneficiaries pay to 
the government an amount equal to the benefit received" is via the institution of taxation (whether 
construed as Lindahl prices or otherwise). We suggest in what follows that public investment (say, in 
education, health, and infrastructure) leads to gains in the productivity of labour and capital.
5 Given 
a well functioning tax system, such private sector gains would lead to higher government revenue on 
account of augmented wages, profits, and value of transactions. Thus tax revenue would serve as the 
observational equivalent of the public gains. Evidently not all revenue (say from the personal income 
tax) arises out of enhanced productivity due to investments in public education and health; but the 
procedure we propose use tax revenue flows only to measure its volatility relative to GDP, as 
stipulated by the writers described above. 
6 
                                                 
4 There is another important distinction between the two results discussed by Arrow-Lind. Note that their first result is 
cast in the same format as the Hirshleifer-Sandmo model of perfect capital markets, where household portfolios are fully 
diversified. The former authors show that the mere qualification of uncorrelated projects alters the conclusion.  The 
second Arrow-Lind result does not require that private capital markets are perfect, and thus individuals may not diversify 
fully. Hence there arises the significance of each bearing very small risks.  
5 Public investment in our context is very much of the public good variety, where there is a clear market failure. 
Private markets are otherwise taken as complete allowing individuals to diversify fully. 
6 Hence the level of revenues are not central to the methods developed here, only the variability.   3 
We conceive a framework where public investment is bond financed, while the debt charges are 
covered by taxation, which only differs marginally from that in Arrow-Lind. In the latter, financing 
is done via taxation, and in the event of positive (negative) net gains taxes are reduced (increased) 
from the planned level. In our framework, the discount rate is derived implicitly as the rate that 
value-maximizing investors are willing to pay for government bonds that are earmarked to be 
serviced by future taxation. 
One procedure to estimate the market risk premium of the revenue flows would be to identify, à la 
Hirshleifer-Sandmo, a publicly traded company that has earnings that matches perfectly the revenue 
flows in question. The risk premium implicit in the latter would then exactly equal what is applicable 
to the firm's equity, where the risk class of the publicly traded company can be identified using asset-
pricing models. Since this is a tedious trial and error procedure, we propose an indirect method to 
identify the risk class of the public flows. Our approach would be capable of determining the 
“market” risk premium of public revenue flows even though we do not observe securities that have 
exclusive claims on the former.
7 
To illustrate further, consider the corporate income tax (CIT). The total CIT base is clearly the 
sum of pre-tax net income of all firms. One may therefore interpret the tax base as a stream of net 
revenue flows arising from a portfolio of corporate equities, where care has been taken to add up 
each component by its relative weight in the total. Given a particular tax schedule, in this instance 
the rate of tax, and for simplicity allowing full loss-offsets, the tax revenue would therefore 
embody the same risk characteristics that afflict corporate earnings. Further note that, assuming 
economic depreciation in the tax schedule, the net income of a firm becomes the conceptually 
correct measure of its return on capital, while changes in its level essentially constitute the accrued 
capital gains on the firm’s equity. Were this source to be the sole revenue claim of a government, 
and it wished to borrow, lenders could logically demand an expected rate of return that reflects the 
riskiness of the de facto collateral asset, namely the CIT base. Claims on future corporate tax 
revenue may therefore be seen to be formally similar to claims on corporate earnings.
8  
Turning to other taxes, one important distinction would be that here even the underlying portfolios 
do not be trade in any actual market unlike the CIT base.
9 An example is that of the personal income 
tax (PIT) revenue. Here the tax base consists of returns to human capital, individual capital and 
entrepreneurial income. Again the taxable part is in the nature of an income net of direct costs of 
earning income, and thus has the interpretation of a return on the totality of human, entrepreneurial 
and physical capital stock attributable to the personal sector of the economy. The latter capital is 
mostly untraded in actual markets, and hence it is conceptually important to develop an appropriate 
measure of the systematic risk implicit in such incomes. The remaining taxes (notably, payroll, 
domestic goods and services, and foreign trade) may be similarly motivated.  
The procedure we develop to derive the risk premium implicit in tax revenue flows proceeds as 
follows. Recall that we interpret tax revenues as the return on public investment, and thus 
revenues serve as surrogate “return” on assets (i.e., bonds) issued to finance the investment in the 
first place. We compare the behaviour of the latter return with the growth rate of earnings of 
                                                 
7 This methodology can be applied to any non-traded asset such as the risk premium implicit in various human 
capital investments as well as evaluating small businesses.  
8 See also Bulow and Summers (1984). 
9 We abstract from the fact that many firms organised as corporate entities merely for tax purposes are closely held, 
and hence do not trade.   4 
another well-known asset, namely the market portfolio (say as measured by the S&P500 index), 
and in particular examine the sensitivity of the relative earnings growth on the two assets with a 
common aggregate factor, that of GDP growth. The differenced series (namely, growth rate of 
tax revenue less the earnings growth on the market portfolio) should be independent of aggregate 
economic conditions if tax revenues are as risky as the stock market. This independence would 
imply that tax revenue commands a risk premium that is of the same magnitude as the market 
portfolio. In the case where the difference in the mutual growth rates is positively (negatively) 
correlated with the growth of the economy then we argue that the risk premium for the tax 
revenue backed security could be higher (lower) than that applicable to the market portfolio.  
The approach cited above has interesting implications for several related issues in public economics, 
namely the choice of the social discount rate, the borrowing capacity of state and local authorities, 
the size of sustainable debt, programs financed by earmarked budgeting, and more broadly, on the 
identification of risk premium implicit in any non-traded asset.
10 The principle focus of this paper is 
on estimating the social discount rate. However, turning to the size of debt, were the Bulow-
Summers’ suggestion that CIT revenues were just as risky as the market portfolio to apply to overall 
revenue, admittedly an extreme hypothesis, no positive debt would be sustainable. More generally, 
however, one can go on to model the limit to debt size under steady state properties of revenue 
flows. The implications for ear-marking are rather evident; should the source of finance be very 
risky, not only would the program output have an unacceptable level of volatility, borrowing against 
future revenue (from the same source) would appear unwise due to its low market value. 
Consequently, ear-marking could be practised only in limited instances where, either, the revenue 
source had little systematic risk, or, by coincidence, both demand for the service and revenue 
claims were near perfectly correlated. 
The balance of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we present the basic methodology of 
evaluating the risk premium. Next we apply the above methodology to the case of tax revenue flows, 
and obtain the estimated risk premium implicit in these flows (section 3). Implications of the 
analysis for the public discount rate are reviewed in section 4, where we find that the risk discount 
rate is even lower for a data set that excludes the Korean War period. Consequently there arises the 
possibility of a “peace dividend”, and we go on to discuss the dividend for the overall size of US 
public debt. Next we offer a few concluding remarks in section 5. Some background results are 
collected in the form of a brief appendix. 
2. Methodology for Valuing the (Implicit) Risk Premium 
We have argued above that tax revenue (especially from personal and corporate source incomes) 
may, at least in a qualitative sense, be taken as the component of the gains from public 
investment that accrues to the public sector. Consequently the discount rate relevant for evaluating 
such future gains, that is to say for the public investment decisions in the first place, should 
reflect the risk inherent in the future returns to physical and human capital. We are thus led to the 
issue of measuring the risk premium implicit in the stochastic behaviour of revenue collections.  
In order to model the public discount rate as construed above, one needs to conceptualise terms such 
as the current market price of future revenue entitlement. To motivate the discussion, consider a 
government willing to currently borrow the market value of its future revenue claims (due k-periods 
                                                 
10 See Shiller (1993)   5 
from now).
11 In the process, we assume that the purchasers of government bonds hold a diversified 
portfolio of assets, and consequently, when valuing the risk embedded in the bond, they would 
naturally evaluate the riskiness of future tax revenue. Once a particular public revenue flow has been 
assigned a “price”, one is led to the idea of the return that the holder of the entitlement would earn 
from such a hypothetical debt instrument. Rational portfolio investors would therefore be willing to 
lend to the state at time-t an expected amount Pt in exchange of the promise of the expected 









R   E   =   P
δ       (2.1) 
In the expression above, Pt may be interpreted as the current “market price” of a claim on the future 
expected revenue stream (“dividends”), (Rt+k), and δ is the risk discount rate.
12  
The appropriate discount rate which explicitly adjusts for the riskiness of the revenue stream may be 
given by the security market equilibrium condition which states that the expected return on an 
investment equals the sum of the risk free rate and a risk premium term that is proportional to the 
excess return on the market portfolio: 
() r   -   r E( b   +   r   =   ) r E(   =   ft mt ft t ) δ .    (2.2) 
In the expression above rt denotes the current “real rate of return” on the security with exclusive 
claims on tax revenue flow (Rt+k), while rft and rmt are, respectively, the risk free rate and the total 
return on the market portfolio.
13 The b-coefficient, or beta, is the measure of the underlying portfolio 
risk, and is defined in the usual way, namely, b = {cov(rt , rmt) /σ
2
m }. The market risk premium 
therefore depends on the co-variability of the return on the revenue-backed asset in question with the 
market portfolio. The risk discount rate is thus decomposable into two components.
14  
The argument thus far is analogous to the standard “capital asset pricing model” (CAPM) developed 
by Lintner (1964), Mossin (1966) and Sharpe (1964). Indeed the conceptual methods advanced by 
Hirshleifer (1964) and Sandmo (1971) for deriving the risk discount rate can be viewed as being 
consistent with the former. If the returns from a particular investment project (tax revenues in the 
present case) were actually independent of any systematic risk, the risk premium would be zero 
                                                 
11 In effect the above procedure does describe the model behind the determination of the government (long-term) 
bond rate. Therefore the extent to which the observed bond rate would differ from that predicted by the model 
would depend on the closeness of the model to the actual investment environment or to the type of tax revenue 
category. We shall have occasion to revisit this issue later in the paper. 
12 In the finance literature this basic valuation formula has been disputed on grounds that asset prices display excessive 
volatility relative to the anticipated stream of future dividends (Shiller, 1981). 
13 An alternative approach to the evaluation of risky tax revenue flows is to compute the certainty equivalent of the risky 
tax revenue and then use the risk free rate to discount the certainty equivalent future flows. See Ahsan and Tsigaris 
(1998). 
14 The above reasoning runs parallel to that advanced by Pauly (1970), who argued that public investment was, 
much like private ones, also subject to the systematic risk embedded in the economy. The latter risk may drive the 
actual yield on a public investment to zero. Thus even though bondholders expect and do receive a fixed coupon, 
“public investment implies assumption by taxpayers of the social risk associated with that investment” (p196). The 
formalisation being proposed here illustrates the principle that “the cost of public investment is not just the interest 
cost of funds to the government but also includes the assumption of social risk by risk-averting taxpayers” (p197). 
In our context, risk premium described in (2.2) is the social risk à la Pauly, while the risk free rate serves as the 









Figure 2.1: The Price Earnings Ratio: 1871-1999
(as the market beta would be zero). In such a case, the appropriate discount rate would be the 
rate of time preference, namely δ = rft. An example may be the wage tax revenue. It is plausible 
that in a diversified economy such revenue would become riskless in the aggregate.
15 At the other 
extreme, Hirshleifer and Sandmo highlight a result where public investment leads to a pattern of 
revenue that perfectly covaries with the market portfolio (i.e., a beta of unity). The public discount 
rate, therefore, coincides with the rate applicable to private projects with the identical market 
risk premium. In such a world, the public sector must emulate private firms in order to achieve 
allocative efficiency.
16 
The CAPM methods can be used to empirically obtain the risk premium associated with 
securities that actually trade in the market. In our case, these methods are however not applicable 
since the beta coefficient cannot be computed due to the non-existence of data on asset prices. 
Below we describe an alternative methodology for measuring the implicit risk premium that is 
general enough to be applicable to any risky asset, including those non-traded.  
We proceed by modelling the dynamic behaviour of the price to earnings ratio (PER) in financial 
markets. We assume that the price behaviour of a traded asset-i at time-t, Pit, and the earnings 
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logarithmic form we have: 










 = ln ,  c0 = lnA, and 0 < c1 < 1  
for a stationary process, and uit is a 
random error term. The assumption 
of stationarity guarantees that the 
price to earnings ratio is mean 
reverting. The long run steady state 
(or, unconditional mean) of the 








p E it −
= .  In the 
event of a shock, the price to 
earnings ratio will deviate from its 
long run level, as would be the case 
with the conditional expectations as 
well. For example, a positive shock 
will result in the PER to increase above its steady state value. Investors will form conditional 
                                                 
15 The argument here is, much in the spirit of Samuelson and Vickrey, that the risk is totally idiosyncratic in the 
aggregate since the government can effectively pool across individual differences. 
16 If one allows sharing of risks (say via public debt) across generations, who are not all simultaneously alive, Ahsan 
and Tsigaris (1998) have shown that the social risk premium would be strictly less than the market premium even 














Figure 2.2: S&P Index and Earnings Growth:
The Solid line is the S&P500 Index
expectations accordingly. Assuming the PER to be a stationary process, they will expect it to 
drop in the future towards its long run equilibrium value. Thus in the long run the price to 
earnings ratio will move back to the unconditional mean provided that there are no further 
shocks. Evidently the price to earnings ratio will fall if either the price falls and/or earnings 
increase until the long run equilibrium is achieved once again. Figure 2.1 shows the historical 
price to earnings ratio for the Standard and Poor 500 index.
17  
The estimation of (2.3) is shown below as: 
0.461 Sq - R   Adj.   0.239, s
10.6735        4.4255        
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    (2.4) 
In order to examine whether the price to earnings ratio is stationary we applied the Dickey-Fuller 
(1979) test by estimating (2.3) again as follows:
18   it it i i it I P a I P ξ γ+ + = ∆ −1 1 0 ) / ln( ) / ln( . We 
tested the significance of the estimated coefficient for i 1 γ . The estimator is -0.2972, and has a t-
value of -4.41. We are therefore 
able to reject the null hypothesis at 
the 1% level of significance, and 
conclude that the price to earnings 
ratio is both stationary and mean 
reverting.
19 The PER seems to be 
reverting to its historical average 
value of 14. The above exercise 
suggests that along a steady state 
the growth rate of prices should 
equal the growth rate of earnings 
per share. Outside a steady state 
the price to earnings ratio would 
of course be changing depending 
on the shock or its conditional expectations. Thus in a steady state we have: 
)} ( { )} ( { it it I g E P g E = ,      (2.5) 
where g(x) denotes the growth rate of any variable-x, a notational feature that we shall maintain 
throughout. Indeed using Shiller's historical annual series from 1871-1999, we obtain the result 
that confirms the equality of the unconditional means of the two series. The annual average 
percentage change in the S&P500 index adjusted for inflation during this period of time was 
4.39% with a standard deviation of 17.6%, while the annual growth rate of the earnings per share 
was 5.13% with a standard deviation of 27.7%. Thus the difference in sample means is -0.0074 
with the t-statistics of -0.26. Thus we cannot reject the hypothesis that the unconditional means 
are equal in the long run. Figure 2.1 indicates the pattern of the growth rates. 
                                                 
17 The data used are from Shiller's homepage: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/.    
18 No lagged terms were necessary since the residuals from this regression behaved appropriately. The results are 
the same as the one depicted in (2.4) except that the coefficient γ = (c1-1). 
19 The critical value from the Dickey Fuller table is –3.42.   8 
Let us now introduce a second asset-j, which may well be non-traded. In the latter event, though 
there will not be any observable price to earnings ratio, we shall argue that the notion of imputed 
price to earnings ratio (IPER) can be used to determine risk. The minimal condition that will be 
required here is that the IPER be defined, and that it be stationary. While we require the IPER for 
asset-j be governed by a stationary process in the manner of (2.3) above, its unconditional mean 
may well be different from that of asset-i.
20 However, in such an event, asset-j will also satisfy 
the long run condition discussed above, namely  )} ( { )} ( { jt jt I g E P g E = much as if it were 
actually traded in the market.
21 This implies that in the long run the following is also true: 
)} ( { )} ( { )} ( { )} ( { jt it jt it I g E I g E P g E P g E − = −    (2.6) 
Furthermore, note that the expected return from any security is not merely the price appreciation 
component but also includes dividend yields. The expected total return from an investment-k is 
given therefore by the sum: ) ( )) ( ( ) ( kt kt kt d E P g E r E + = .  
Using Shiller's series (1871-1999), 
the historical average dividend yield 
over this long period of time comes 
to 3.2% (when adjusted for 
inflation) with a standard deviation 
equal to 8.7%.
22 The real rate of 
interest as proxied by the annual 
yield on the holding of commercial 
paper has been around the same 
value (3.3%) with the same standard 
deviation.
23 The difference in the 
average yields is statistically 
insignificant. Figure 2.3 provides 
the historical the pattern of the two series. 
Therefore we adjust (2.6) as follows: 
() ( ) ) ( )} ( { ) ( )} ( { ) ( ) ( jt jt it it jt it d E I g E d E I g E r E r E + − + = −    (2.7) 
Next step in the process is to find economic determinants of the expected growth of the rate of 
return on assets, earnings and dividends. As already stipulated above, for the overall rate of 
return on asset-k we use the security market line: ( ) ft mt k ft kt r r E b r r E − + = ) ( ) ( , where the factor 







b = . Substituting the 
                                                 
20 The parameters c0 and c1 could differ relative to the market’s price earnings autoregressive process.   
21 Note that the growth rates for two different assets could also differ along a steady state. 
22 The nominal dividend yield averages 4.8 with a standard deviation of only 1.3%. Thus all the additional volatility 
arises from the PPI inflation adjustment. 
23 The Pearson correlation between the two series was equal to 0.93. This implies that the dividend yield behaves 





















Figure 2.3: Dividend yield and Interest Rates:
1871-1999
Solid Line: Dividend yield
to measure inflation
Adjusted Using the January PPI Index  9 
market equilibrium condition for the determinant of the rate of return of assets into equation 
(2.7), we get the following expression:
24 
( )( ) () ( ) ) ( )) ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( jt jt it it ft mt j i d E I g E d E I g E r r E b b + − + = − −    (2.8) 
If we now allow one of the assets to represent the market portfolio, say asset-i, (i.e., let i = m), 
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1   (2.9) 
Since any earnings growth (inclusive of dividends) contains systematic risk we need to obtain 
the sensitivity factor with respect to the state of the economy. We hypothesise that the actual 
growth rate of earnings plus dividend yields for any asset-k is sensitive to the rate of growth of 
GDP, Y, (or, for that matter, any common aggregate indicator embodying systematic risk) as 
specified below:  kt t k kt kt e Y g a d I g + = + ) ( ) ( 1 . Here ekt denotes a zero mean idiosyncratic, but 
investment specific shock, while a1k (k = j, m) is the sensitivity coefficient for the k-th asset. 
Differencing, we therefore obtain: 
( ) () jt t m j mt mt jt jt w Y g a a d I g d I g + − = + − + ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 1    (2.10)  
The above formulation indicates that the growth rate of the economy, the common factor, is a 
determinant of the differences in the growth rate (inclusive of dividends, if any) of earnings on 
asset-j vis-à-vis that of the market portfolio. Hence if it turns out that there is no dependence 
between the relative earnings on these assets and the evolution of the state of the economy, we 
may then claim that the two assets belong to the same risk class.   
Continuing the above line of reasoning, we note that if the coefficient of output growth in (2.10) 
were negative (positive), asset-j would be interpreted as less (more) risky than the market. Notice 
that the imputed earnings of a non-traded asset plus its dividend yield is expected to grow more 
in the long run than the corresponding flows of the market portfolio if and only if the GDP 
sensitivity of the former is greater than that of the market. The estimated coefficient in (2.10) is 
obtained from short run movements in the variables and is given as follows: 
)} ( var{
)} ( ), ) ( ( ) ) ( cov{(
) ( 1 1
t
t mt mt it jt
m j Y g
Y g d I g d I g
a a
+ − +
= −    (2.10a) 
This measures the sensitivity of the differences in growth rate of the earnings flow to output 
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1 1        (2.11) 
                                                 
24 In effect we assume that the non-traded asset would be priced according to the security market line.  
25 We may also use the above framework to compare one non-traded asset with another, but in that case we cannot 
say anything about the absolute value of its risk premium only relative. The comparison with a traded asset's 
riskiness allows us to obtain explicit values for the riskiness of the non-traded asset.   
26 Note that in (2.11) we have denoted the long run expected output (i.e., the trend rate) without a time subscript. 
This convention will be followed throughout the rest of the paper.   10 
Notice that for  m j a a 1 1 = , we get  1 = j b  as argued above. Otherwise, if a1j is smaller (larger) than 
a1m, clearly the beta will then be smaller (greater) than unity.  
The final step in the analysis is to find out how sensitive is the market excess return to the 
growth rate of the economy. Following (2.10), we model the current market risk premium and 
GDP as follows: 
( ) jt t m ft mt e Y g r r + = − + ) ( 1 λ        (2.12) 
where the coefficient λm measures the "beta" sensitivity of the current market premium to the future 
growth rate of GDP.
27 Hence in expectation terms, the market risk premium in the long run is 
proportional to the growth rate of output as follows: )} ( { ) ( Y g E r r E m ft mt λ = − . The estimated 
coefficient from (2.12), obtained from short-run data, is given by: 
)} ( var{
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This latter coefficient measures the sensitivity of the market risk premium to future economic 










+ =         (2.13) 
The beta of any security may therefore be interpreted as equalling the beta of the market 
portfolio (which is unity) plus a factor that is determined by the ratio of the relative sensitivities 
of the differential earnings flow on the two assets and the market excess return to output growth. 
In the special case where  m m a1 = λ , we get an even simpler expression namely that the beta 








1 = . The interpretation of the required condition is simply that the covariance 
between market risk premium and output growth be the same as the covariance between the total 
return on the market portfolio (inclusive of dividend growth) and output growth.  
The above analysis therefore illustrates a procedure by which we may empirically estimate the 
beta coefficient, and thus the risk premium, for a non-traded asset. From (2.13) it is clear that one 
merely needs to estimate three parameters, namely a1j, a1m and λm, of which only the first utilise 
information on the non-traded asset-j. Indeed estimating the first of these parameters requires 
long period data on the imputed rate of return on the asset, and the hypotheses that the dynamic 
behaviour of the latter was similar to that of a market portfolio. To the extent these assumptions 
may be taken as plausible ex post would depend on the nature of the quantitative results and their 
accordance with intuition, issues to which we shall now turn our attention.         
 
 
                                                 
27 Equation (2.12) may be viewed as embodying the hypothesis that the stock market is a leading indicator of 
cyclical shocks. Alternatively, writing the output term as a deviation from the trend level, and suitably adding a 
constant term equalling the latter, one would obtain a single factor arbitrage pricing theory interpretation of the 
ERM behaviour as developed by Ross (1976), and later expanded by Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) and Burmeister 
and Wall (1986).   11 
3. Systematic Risk in Revenue Flows 
In this section, we apply the above methodology to estimate the risk premium implicit in tax revenue 
flows for the period 1950-2000.
28 Here we shall interpret the various revenue categories-j as 
examples of implicit returns on the corresponding asset-j, which will serve as the second asset as 
analytically modelled above. We start with an examination of the sensitivity of revenue growth to 
GDP behaviour. 
3.1 Revenue–GDP Behaviour: We may generally write the tax revenue function as  
) ), ( ( ) ( t t t t jt Y F B F R τ τ = ,      (3.1) 
where Rjt is the real tax revenue received by the government from the j-th source, while F(τt) is 
the tax schedule, and Bt(F(τ), Yt,) denotes the tax base. We conceive the long run output as given 
by a function, Y =Y(N, K, T), where the independent variables are population (N), stock of capital 
(K), technology (T).
29 Given (3.1), we hypothesise that the tax revenue is a stable exponential 
function of GDP, 
jt je AY R t jt
ξ γ = , where ξjt is a random error term with mean zero. It will be 
convenient to express the above in the log-linear form: 
jt t j j jt Y R ξ γ γ+ + = ln ln 1 0 .      (3.2) 
The coefficient in the above regression is the long run output elasticity of tax revenue, which 
measures the long run growth potential of revenue source-j [Sobel and Holcombe (1996), 
Williams et al. (1973)].  
However, for the short run analysis we apply the theory of co-integration as developed by 
Granger (1981) and later expanded by Engle and Granger (1987) integrating the short run 
dynamics with long run equilibrium relationships.
30 In the short run if the tax revenue and 
income variables are co-integrated then there exists an error correction form such that the 
realised rate of growth of the actual revenue stream would depend on the growth rate of GDP 
and on the last period dis-equilibrium error from the long run relationship: 
jt t t j jt v Y g a R g + + = −1 1 1 ) ( ) ( ξ ρ .     (3.3) 
In (3.3)  j a1 measures the sensitivity of tax revenue with respect to output. Note that 
(0 1 1 < < −ρ ) shows the speed at which the error, [ ] 1 1 0 1 1 ln ln − − − + − = t j j jt jt Y R γ γ ξ , corrects the 
growth of tax revenue. If the revenue obtained in the previous period exceeds the long run target 
                                                 
28 Appendix 1 illustrates some sample properties of the various revenue categories and GDP profile over the period 
1950-2000 
29 One has to be cautious with revenue flows since the realised values of tax revenue depend not only on risk factors 
such as the business cycle, but also on structural changes in the tax and spending codes and the rate schedule, albeit 
with a lag. A typical example would be an anticipatory counter-cyclical fiscal policy to combat a bad state of nature. 
However, as Barro (1979) has argued, governments appear not to change the rate schedule and tax code too 
frequently due to concern over the efficiency costs of the tax system. Thus even though observed variations in the 
growth rates of revenues may suffer from the noise due to legislative tinkering with the tax code, we show that one 
may still obtain an estimate of the risk premiums implicit in the tax revenue flows. See also Groves and Kahn 
(1952). 
30 If in fact GDP and the revenue variables are found not to be co-integrated, it implies that either there is no long 
run relationship between the two variables or that there is a third variable that is missing from the specification.   12 
then 0 1 > − jt ξ , and given  0 1 < ρ , it will reduce this period’s revenue growth. The closer to zero is 
this parameter the slower will be the speed of adjustment. The precise short-run error correction 
model we estimate has a constant term as well:
31  
jt t t j j jt v Y g a a R g + + + = −1 1 1 0 ) ( ) ( ξ ρ      (3.4) 
Evidently in the absence of co-integration, we would estimate (3.4) without the dis-equilibrium 
error term. The co-integration results are briefly reviewed in appendix 2, where we find evidence 
that the personal income tax (PIT) and total tax (TOT) revenue streams are co-integrated with 
GDP, while the remaining revenues are not co-integrated with GDP. The short run results are 
presented in Table 3.1, which demonstrate that there is a strong relationship between the growth 
behaviour of tax revenue streams and the evolution of the macro economy. The largest short run 
tax elasticity is obtained for the corporate tax revenue. A one percent drop in economic growth 
results in nearly four percent drop in the growth rate of CIT revenue. Even though there may 
appear no significant relationship between the two variables in the long run, there is indeed a 
strong relationship in short run fluctuations suggesting that CIT revenue carries systematic risk.  
Each of personal, total tax revenue, and the social insurance contributions (SIC) has income 
elasticity at least as large as unity. However, for both PIT and TOT, the growth rate also depends 
strongly on last period's disequilibrium error. In fact, if the last period revenue increased beyond 
the sustainable long run rate, the growth of revenue will fall by half that amount the following 
year. This implies that the federal government cannot increase the tax rate and expect an increase 
in the future growth rate of tax revenue if such a hike is not warranted by economic 
fundamentals. The speed of adjustment to the long run equilibrium seems extremely rapid (i.e., 
two years for total revenue). Indeed it is intuitive that tax revenue cannot grow beyond that is 
dictated by long run conditions. The least responsive is the excise tax (EXT) revenue, admittedly 
a minor category. 
Estimating (3.4), it can be seen that the long-run output elasticity for PIT and TOT are each close 
to unity, and given that these variables are also co-integrated with output, from equation (3.2) it 
would follow that  )}. ( { )} ( { Y g E R g E jt =
32 In other words, the steady state revenue growth, for 
both total and personal income taxes, would equal the long run growth of the economy. 




























                                                 
31 Note that where the revenue variables are co-integrated with output, the intercept term in (3.4) would drop out, 
and hence not be statistically significant (which is indeed the case for TOT and PIT in Table 3.1).  
32 Indeed using the dynamic ordinary least squares method (DOLS) as was suggested by Hayashi (2000) we obtain 
elasticities of 1.06 and 1.04, respectively, for PIT and TOT (Ahsan-Tsigaris, 2002).    13 




NA 0.317  2.51 




NA 0.172  1.91 






NA 0.000  1.97 
Notes: * indicates significant at the 1% level. NA denotes the non-applicability of the error term, as the 
variables in question happen not to be co-integrated with output. 
 
3.2 Relative Asset Returns and GDP Sensitivity: We now examine the risk embedded in the tax 
revenue flows vis-à-vis the market in terms of their relative GDP sensitivity. To do this we start 
with equation (2.12), and interpret the j-th asset as being the underlying non-traded asset that has 
claims on the relevant revenue flows, and whose combined earnings and dividend growth mimics 
the growth rate of the revenue source-j: } ) ( { ) ( jt jt jt d I g R g + = . In the process, we modify (2.12) 
by adding an intercept term, and an error correction term for PIT and TOT. The latter feature 
requires one to enter the GDP variable in terms of deviations from its mean, and thus we obtain: 
() ( ) jt t t m j m j mt mt jt w g Y g a a a a d I g R g + + − − + − = + − −1 1 1 1 0 0 ) ) ( )( ( ) ( ) ( ξ ρ .   (3.5) 
Table 3.2 presents the differences in the average growth rates and their significance. This is the 
intercept term of the above equation. While the focus of the discussion here is the revenue 
behaviour and the market rate of return, i.e., the last row, the table below includes the relative 
pattern of growth between tax categories as well.
33 The interesting fact to note is that the 
difference between the growth rate of revenue flows and average growth rate of earnings per 
share (inclusive of the dividend yield) of the S&P500 index is not statistically significant except 
for EXT and CIT, where both grew on average at a lower rate than the total return on the market 
portfolio. In other words, we find that PIT, SIC and TOT categories do on average grow at about 
the same rate as GDP.  
In Table 3.3 we examine the relative short-run output elasticities of the total return between 
different assets. From (3.5) it is obvious that were the i-th asset be the market portfolio, the net 
elasticity is merely (a1j – a1m). Recall that these a1k-terms (k = j,m) form the parameters of the 
implicit risk premium relevant for the non-traded asset as described in (2.16) above. Here again 
the focus of attention lies in the last row; however, for the sake of completeness all revenue 
sources are also included in the estimation. Comparing various revenue growth rates relative to 
the growth rate of total revenue, (i.e., the GTOT-row), we find that while all revenue sources 
carry some systematic risk, CIT and EXT (though a minor source) are more volatile than PIT or 
SIC. Examining the last row, it is clear that we cannot reject the hypothesis that corporate tax 
revenue is as sensitive to macroeconomic volatility as the total return on the market portfolio, 
namely the S&P 500 index. Indeed all other revenues would appear to belong to a lower risk 
class than the market. 
                                                 
33 Indeed the mutual difference in growth rates of different revenue variables are not statistically significant in most 
cases with the exception of social insurance contributions.   14 
 Table 3.2: Differences in Average Growth Rates, (a0j – a0m): 1950-2000 
  GPIT GCIT GSIC GEXT GTOT  GMP 
GPIT  0         
GCIT  0.025 (0.113)  0         
GSIC  -0.018 (0.044)  -0.044(0.013)  0       
GEXT  0.037 (0.014)  0.014 (0.530)  0.058 (0.000)  0     
GTOT  0.004 (0.277)  -0.021 (0.085)  0.022 (0.002)  -0.033 (0.018)  0   
GMP   -0.014 (0.411)  -0.041 (0.066)  0.004 (0.816)  -0.054 (0.008)  -0.018 (0.245)  0 
Note: The dependent variable is the column variable minus the row variable; a positive (negative) 
coefficient value implies that the average growth rate of the column variable exceeded (fell below) 
that in the corresponding row variable. P-values are shown in parenthesis. GMP denotes the 
growth rate of earnings per share plus the dividend yield for the S&P 500 index, which were 
obtained from Shiller.  
 
Table 3.3: Relative Short-Run Sensitivity Measures, (a1j – a1m): 1950-2000 
 GPIT  GCIT  GSIC  GEXT  GTOT  GMP 
GPIT  0         
GCIT  1.03 (0.183)  0         
GSIC  0.40 (0.361)  2.73 (0.001)  0       
GEXT  1.10 (0.129)  3.58 (0.000)  0.85 (0.191)  0     
GTOT  0.16 (0.371)  0.84 (0.168)  -0.35 (0.294)  -0.97 (0.157)  0   
GMP   -1.41 (0.097)  1.19 (0.214)  -1.54 (0.035)  -2.39 (0.007)  -1.91 (0.018)  0 
Note: Column variable net of row variable creates the dependent variable; the independent variable 
is the unexpected GDP deviations from its drift. Positive (negative) coefficient means more (less) 
risky column relative to the corresponding row variable. P-values appear in the brackets against 
each estimate.  
The next table re-estimates the relative short run elasticity measures without the Korean War 
years of 1950-1952. As seen in appendix 1, these years had most of the extreme values, and the 
volatility of many of the revenue flows would be higher than without these war years. 
Parameters reported in Table 3.4 suggest that the GDP-sensitivity figures become uniformly 
much sharper in the absence of the war, though qualitatively remaining much the same. While, 
corporate tax revenue remains statistically riskier than any other revenue category vis-à-vis the 
market portfolio, the coefficient is estimated with more precision when the Korean War years are 
excluded from the sample.
34 In what follows we would illustrate the risk premium calculations 
using both sets of estimate, i.e., with and without the war years. 
 
 
                                                 
34 This also allows us to examine the sensitivity of our results.   15 
Table 3.4: Relative Short-Run Sensitivity Measures, (a1j – a1m): 1953-2000 
 GPIT  GCIT  GSIC  GEXT  GTOT  GMP 
GPIT  0         
GCIT  -1.55 (0.059)  0         
GSIC  0.47 (0.317)  2.95 (0.001)  0       
GEXT  1.24 (0.114)  3.79 (0.001)  0.83 (0.267)  0     
GTOT  0.24 (0.215)  1.12 (0.069)  -0.46 (0.193)  -1.20 (0.108)  0   
GMP   -2.13 (0.010)  0.28 (0.772)  -2.68 (0.001)  -3.51 (0.000)  -2.57 (0.001)  0 
Note: Column variable net of row variable creates the dependent variable; the independent variable 
is the unexpected GDP deviations from its drift. Positive (negative) coefficient means more (less) 
risky column relative to the corresponding row. P-values appear in the brackets against each 
estimate. 
  
4. Implicit Risk Premium and Discount Rates 
From the above analysis it seems that the public revenue flows are risky and carry systematic or 
economy wide risk. Can we measure a pseudo beta for these flows as if the underlying assets 
actually traded in the market? Indeed the procedure described in section 2 yields an expression 









+ =        (4.1) 
The beta of any security is therefore equal to the beta of the market portfolio (which is unity) 
plus a factor that depends on the relative sensitivities of the total return (on asset-j vis-à-vis the 
market portfolio) to output growth, namely (a1j – a1m). The latter coefficient is actually weighted 
by the inverse of the sensitivity of the market excess return to output growth (i.e., the 
denominator, λm in 4.1).  
The last row in each of Tables 3.3 and 3.4 above presented estimates of the coefficient (a1j – a1m). 
All that remains is to obtain an estimate of λm in order to compute the risk premium as measured 
by the beta specified here. Recall the specification of the market excess return as given by (2.12) 
above. Modelling the output term as deviations from trend, we have:  
( ) () jt t m ft mt e Y g E Y g a r r + − + = − + ) ( { ) ( 1 0 λ  
Using Shiller’s data for the period 1950-1999 yields the following results:  
1.55    D.W.    .304,   Sq - R   Adj.
4.74          4.15       
)) ( ) ( ( 1597 . 3 06348 . 0 ˆ ˆ 1
stats t
Y g Y g r r t ft mt
−
− + = − +
     (4.2)   16 
The sensitivity of the current excess return to the future growth of the economy is therefore 
estimated as 3.16. In other words, a one-percent drop in the future growth rate of output will 
reduce the expected current excess return in the market by about 3.16 percent.
35 
The intercept term indicates the sample average excess return over the estimated period, i.e., the 
market risk premium is estimated at 6.35 percent.
36 Over the entire sample period (1950-2000), the 
mean real return on the S&P500 index has been 8.96 percent annually (inclusive of dividends). 
Thus, the average real risk free rate is obtained as the mean real return on the market net of 
market risk premium, 8.96-6.35 = 2.61. The latter equals the average real yield (over this period) 
on prime commercial paper of a 6-month maturity.
37  
Which risk free rate should the public sector use in figuring out the public discount rate? Textbooks 
usually introduce the notion of the risk free rate via portfolio choice theory, which postulates the 
existence of one risk-free asset, usually taken to be Treasury bills or comparable short-term 
sovereign debt.
38 The annualized short-term rates presumably may not be suggestive of 
individual’s forecast of the macroeconomic fundamentals (e.g., inflation). However, since we are 
interested in estimating the expected social discount rate over a 50-year period, the average 
value, over 50 years, of the annualized short term rates should be reflective of the 
macroeconomic fundamental in the long run.
39 In the remainder of the paper we shall interpret 
the 2.61 figure as the real risk free rate of interest from the private market’s point of view.
40   
Combining the estimated value of λm (from equation 4.2 above) with GDP sensitivity terms as 
reported in the last row of Table 3.3 above, we derive the beta (using equation 4.1) for all the assets 
that have exclusive claims on different tax categories analysed here. These are shown in the third 
column of Table 4.1 below. Following the security market equilibrium condition, the risk premia 
for different assets are calculated as the product of the market risk premium and the asset-
specific beta’s:  
)] r   -   r [E(   b   +   r   =   ft mt j ft j δ       (4.3) 
Hence we calculate the risk premium associated with these specific revenue backed securities by 
merely multiplying the estimated beta’s (column 3) with the excess return (estimated as 6.35 in 
equation 4.2). The outcome is shown in column four of Table 4.1.  
The final column in Table 4.1, illustrates the discount rate applicable to projects, which would 
yield the revenue streams of riskiness as depicted by the left hand column in the table (see 
                                                 
35 The sensitivity factor without the Korean War years happens to be similar at 3.2638. 
36 These figures are in accordance with the equity premium literature [e.g., Mehra and Prescott (1985)].   
37 See Robert J. Shiller, Market Volatility, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 1989. Data have been updated online at 
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data/chapt26.html 
38 Note that the qualification that the asset in question be sovereign debt is presumably meant to rule out any default 
risk. One may thus extend the argument to be just as applicable to AAA corporate bonds.  
39 Short run fluctuations in the risk free rate around its equilibrium value will tend to cancel out over a long period 
of years. 
40 If one were to argue that a longer horizon is relevant when it comes to evaluating both the yield and financing issues in 
public investments in infrastructure and the like, the "long" 10-year maturity yield on t-bills has a nominal average rate 
of 7.53 per annum (over the period 1962-99), while the average inflation rate was 4.06. Thus the real risk free rate 
over this period is around 3.47, which is higher than the 2.61 figure used above. Interestingly the one-year t-bill rate 
over the same horizon is 2.74, which is rather close to the private sector's yield on 6-month certificates of deposit 
(2.612).    17 
equation 4.3). These rates merely add up the figures in column four and the relevant risk free rate 
(argued to be 2.61 percent from the private market’s point of view). From the table we see that the 
financial markets would demand that any project that yields a pattern of return that mimics the 
corporate tax revenue stream face a very large risk premium. Indeed here the figure in question is 
even higher than that applicable on the market portfolio. However, the risk premium drops 
significantly if we use the other revenue categories as reflecting the return implicit in the 
corresponding assets.  
The approach of this paper, namely the interpretation of tax revenues as the return on public 
investment, points out that while the investment is risky, the aggregate risk implicit in total revenue 
is far less volatile than the market portfolio. This then is the rationale for advocating a risk discount 
rate that is below the market rate. Indeed the figures highlighted above suggests that the discount 
rate applicable to total public revenue, which is typically the de facto collateral for all public debt, is 
merely 5.13 percent annually vis-à-vis the market rate of about nine percent (8.96, to be precise). 
This corresponds to a rebate of 43 percent on the market rate. 















GCIT 1.194  1.378  8.750  11.360 
GPIT  -1.405 0.555  3.526  6.136 
GSIC  -1.537 0.514  3.261  5.871 
GEXT  -2.388 0.244  1.551  4.161 
GTOT  -1.906 0.397  2.520  5.130 
GMP  0.000 1.000  6.350  8.960 
 Note: (a) The figures in this column are taken from the last row in Table 3.3.All 
computed values are in real terms. 
How then one may rationalize the fact that the public sector is actually able to borrow at even lower 
rates, i.e., in a range of figures varying from 2.61 (six months) to the long-term (ten year) real rate of 
3.47 percent as cited above, each of which corresponds to a zero value of beta? To us the reason this 
happens is due to the state’s ability to engage in intergenerational risk sharing. Capital asset pricing 
models does not price securities that can spread aggregate risks across generations, only within the 
current generation. The intergenerational argument formalized by Gordon and Varian (1988), and 
further extended by Ahsan and Tsigaris (1998), states that the government's ability to pre-commit 
many unborn generations in sharing risks with the current generation implies that the risk premium 
applicable to the public sector becomes negligible. In other words, the systematic risk facing a given 
generation becomes in effect idiosyncratic when pooled with the independent lotteries of many 
generations to come. Consequently, the risk free rate emerges as the socially optimal discount rate. 
The above conclusion is similar to the much earlier result of Arrow-Lind (1970), though the 
rationale is different. In the latter context, the state was modelled as undertaking many uncorrelated 
risky projects at a point in time, which according to our empirical investigation does not appear to 
hold true. To the extent the results presented above are taken to be robust, it calls for a different 
explanation behind the validity of the risk free public discount rate. The rationale whereby the state   18 
pools uncorrelated risky revenues of many generations together would appear to be the dominant 
criterion.  
We may thus interpret the difference between the risk-free borrowing rate and the above risk-
adjusted estimate as a measure of the dividend to society from the ability of the state to spread risk 
across generations. Using the Table 4.1 figures, the annual value of the generational risk-spreading 
dividend to society is merely the risk premium times net national debt, namely 2.52% of 6.095 
trillion USD, i.e., 153.6 billion.
41 On a per capita basis, the dividend comes to about $500 annually in 
interest savings. 
Peace Dividend: We next re-compute the risk premia and discount rates when the Korean War is 
excluded from the data set. Not surprisingly, we find that risk premia decline for all revenue 
categories. The short risk free rate happens to be 2.81, a little higher than before, while the risk 
premium drops to 5.48.  Consequently, the public risk discount rate (using TOT) reduces to 3.97 
percent, as in Table 4.2), which represents an even larger rebate of 52 percent on the market rate, 
which in turn also falls a little (8.29 vs. 8.96 before). We interpret the difference the borrowing costs 
implied by our analysis for the two data sets as the “peace dividend”, i.e. the difference between 
figures in the last column of Table 4.1 less those in column 5 in Table 4.2. The peace dividend in 
terms of lower borrowing costs for the public sector from not having war exceeds one percent (i.e., 
5.13 minus 3.97, or, 1.16, more precisely) for the total tax revenue stream. At the current debt level, 
the above dividend figure would correspond to an annual saving to the tune of 70.5 billion dollars.
42 
  


















GCIT 0.276  1.0846  5.9430  8.754  2.605 
GPIT  -2.129 0.3477  1.9905  4.717  1.420 
GSIC  -2.677 0.1798  0.9850  3.797  2.074 
GEXT  -3.511 -0.0757  -0.4150  2.397  1.764 
GTOT  -2.572 0.2120  1.1610  3.973  1.157 
GMP  0.000 1.000  5.4795  8.291  0 
Note: (a) The figures in this column are taken from the last row in Table 3.4. All 
computed values are in real terms 
5. Conclusion, Extension and Further Work  
Until now the literature on the proper risk discount rate for public investment has been of an 
analytical nature, the primary contributors being Arrow-Lind, Hirshleifer and Sandmo. In all these 
contexts the rate of discount applicable to a public investment is argued to depend, at least in 
principle, on the type of investment. The different conclusions arising from these studies amount to 
                                                 
41 The debt figures used in this illustration is taken form the US Debt Clock, US Treasury which on June on June 
14, 2002 stood at 6.095 trillion dollars. This figure translates to an outstanding debt of $21,199 per person. 
42 The latter figure is calculated at 0.0116 times the national debt.   19 
questioning whether the returns from public investment correlate well with the GDP components, 
and this must ultimately be an empirical matter. Indeed the above authors themselves had argued in a 
similar vein. In this paper, we devise a mechanism that enables us to actually carry out the test.
 We 
have argued that it is conceptually correct to treat a portion of the tax revenue collected by the 
government as due return on public investment in infrastructure that accrues to the public sector. The 
co-variability between the return from public investment and GDP then simplifies to one between 
government revenue flows and GDP. 
We find that revenue component such as the CIT is highly correlated with the market. For 
investment in public goods, however, it is the aggregate revenue that ought to matter. And at that 
level the relevant risk premium is fairly small in absolute terms. The gap between the (real) risk free 
rate and the risk adjusted social discount rate for total revenue is about two percentage points. 
Another way of looking at that statistic is to reflect that the risk adjusted public discount rates cited 
above are a mere fraction (half or even less) of the rate applicable to private projects of average (i.e., 
equal to market) risk. Major wars are likely to add to macro risks, and we detect some evidence of 
this happening based on the Korean War period.  
In conclusion, we believe that the empirical determination of the risk discount rate applicable for 
pubic investment is an important but hitherto neglected topic. Other possible applications of the 
methodology described in the paper can be used to estimate risk premiums of different types of 
human capital investments, small business valuations, social insurance benefits, and other publicly 
non-traded assets. Finally, nesting the intergenerational risk shifting aspects of the debate into the 
design of econometric specification could be explored in future work.     20 
References 
Ahsan, S. M. and P. Tsigaris, (2002), “Long-run Behaviour of Tax Revenues and Sustainable Debt 
Management”, (in progress). 
Ahsan, S. M. and P. Tsigaris, (1998), "The Design of a Consumption Tax under Capital Risk", Journal of 
Economics /Zeitschrift fuer Nationaloekonomie, 68(1), 53-78. 
Arrow, K.J., and R.C. Lind, (1970), "Uncertainty and the Evaluation of Public Investment Decisions," 
American Economic Review, 60, 364-378. 
Bulow J.I. and L.H. Summers, (1984), "Taxation of Risky Assets," Journal of Political Economy, 92, 20-39. 
Burmeister E., and K.D. Wall, (1986), “The Arbitrage Pricing Theory and Macroeconomic Factor Measures, 
The Financial Review, 21 (1), p 1-20. 
Chen, N., R. Roll, and S.A. Ross, (1986), “Economic Forces and the Stock Market: Testing the APT and 
Alternative Asset Pricing Theories.” Journal of Business, 59 (3), 383-403. 
Dickey, D. A., and W. A. Fuller, (1979), “Distribution of the Estimators for Autoregressive Time Series with a 
Unit Root,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 74, 366, 427-431.  
Eaton, J. and H.S. Rosen, (1980a), "Labour Supply, Uncertainty, and Efficient Taxation," Journal of Public 
Economics, 14, 365-374.  
Eaton, J. and H. Rosen, (1980b), "Taxation, Human Capital, and Uncertainty," American Economic Review, 
70 (4), 705-715. 
Engel, R. F., and C.W.J. Granger, (1987), “Co-integration and Error Correction: Representation, 
Estimation, and Testing,” Econometrica, 55, 2, 251-276. 
Gordon, R.H., (1985), "Taxation of Corporate Capital Income: Tax Revenues Versus Tax Distortions," 
Quarterly Review of Economics, 100(1), 1-27. 
Gordon, R.H., and H.R. Varian, (1988), "Intergenerational Risk Sharing," Journal of Public Economics, 37, 
185-202. 
Groves, H. M., and C.H. Kahn, (1952), “The Stability of State and Local Tax Yields,” American Economic 
Review, 42, 2, 111-20. 
Granger, C. (1981), “Some Properties of Time Series Data and their Use in Econometric Model 
Specification.” Journal of Econometrics, 16, pp. 121-130. 
Hamilton, J.H., (1987), "Taxation, Savings, and Portfolio Choice in a Continuous Time Model," Public 
Finance, 42 (2), 264-282. 
Hayashi F., 2000, Econometrics, Princeton University Press. 
Hirshleifer, J., (1964) "Efficient Allocation of Capital in an Uncertain World," American Economic Review, 
77-85. 
Hirshleifer, J., (1966) "Investment Decision under Uncertainty: Applications of the State-Preference 
Approach," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 80, 252-77. 
Lintner, J. (1965), "The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios 
and Capital Budgets," Review of Economics and Statistics, 13-37. 
Maddison A. (1991), The Dynamic Forces in Capitalist Development: A Long Run Comparative View. 
Oxford, Oxford University Press.    21 
Mehra, R. and E.C. Prescott, (1985),  “The Equity Premium: A Puzzle”, Journal of Monetary Theory, 15, 
145-61. 
Mossin, J., (1966), "Equilibrium in a Capital Asset Market," Econometrica, 768-83. 
Pauly, M. (1970), “Risk and the Social Rate of Discount”, American Economic Review, 60(1), 195-98. 
Ross, S.A. (1976), “The Arbitrage Pricing Theory of Capital Asset Pricing.” Journal of Economic Theory, 4, 
341-360 
Samuelson, P.A. (1964), "Principles of Efficiency: Discussion," American Economic Review, P&P, 54, 93-96. 
Sandmo, A., (1972), "Discount Rates for Public Investment Under Uncertainty," International Economic 
Review, 13, 287-302. 
Sharpe, W. F., (1964),  “Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium under Conditions of 
Risk”, J of Finance, 19, 425-42. 
Shiller, R., (1981), "Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to be Justified by Subsequent Changes in Dividends," 
American Economic Review, 421-36. 
Shiller, R., (1993), “Macro Markets: Creating Institutions for Managing Society’s Largest Economic Risks,” 
Clarendon Lectures in Economics, Oxford University Press. 
Sobel, R. S., and R. G. Holcombe (1996), “Measuring the Growth and Variability of tax Bases over the 
Business Cycle,” National Tax Journal, 49 (4), 535-52.  
Varian H.R. (1980), "Redistributive taxation as social insurance." Journal of Public Economics, 31, 237-
51. 
Vickrey, W., (1964), "Principles of Efficiency: Discussion," American Economic Review, P&P, 54, 88-92. 
Williams, W.V., R.M. Anderson, D.O. Froehie, and K.L. Lamb, (1973), “The Stability, Growth and 
Stabilizing Influence of State Taxes,” National Tax Journal, 26, 2, 267-74.   22 
Appendix 1: The Pattern of the Revenue and Expenditure Flows 
Our data covers the period 1950-2000 and are obtained from the Office of Management of 
Budget (OMB) website.
43 Figure A1 below shows the pattern of personal, corporate, social 
insurance contributions, excise and total tax revenue, in real terms, over the above period.
44 From 
the pattern of the data we can 
see that the personal, social 
insurance contributions and total 
tax revenue have trended  
 
upwards with fluctuations along 
the path, while corporate and the 
excise tax revenue do not show 
any apparent trend other than 
being very volatile. This is a first 
indication that the variables may 
be non-stationary, which if 
verified, would have important 
implication in the estimation 
work to be described below.  
Table A.1 provides us with some descriptive statistics on the real growth in various tax revenue, 
g(Rjt), and payments to persons for the US (federal) government over the same period. These 
include sample results such as the sample mean or drift parameter, standard deviation of the 
growth rate, significance of the sample average, the range of values and the growth rate 
computed from a deterministic trend line with its corresponding significance.
45  Just as figure 1 
indicated average rates of growth have been positive and quite large for the three largest tax 
revenue sources. The largest average growth is observed in social insurance contributions (SIC). 
The highest standard deviation is observed, not unexpectedly, in the case of the corporate income 
tax (CIT). We note that the volatility of CIT growth is significantly higher than most other public 
flows; the standard deviation for CIT is approximately 15 percent vs. 7 percent for the growth 
rate of the personal income tax revenue. The t-stats column for the sample average growth rate 
                                                 
43 The website is http://www.access.gpo.gov/usbudget/index.html. Table 2.1 of the historical data were used for the 
main tax receipts categories such as individual income tax receipts, corporate income tax receipt, social insurance 
contributions and retirement receipts, excise tax, and total receipts. The GDP and the deflator were obtained from 
table 10.1 of the same source. The payments to individuals, direct payments as well as grants to state and local 
authorities, were obtained from table 11.1. 
44 The OMB data is on a fiscal year basis, which in the US case, begins in October 30 and ends on the subsequent 
September 30. Prior to 1977, the fiscal year started on July 1 and ended on June 30 of the subsequent year. GDP and 
deflators have been adjusted to reflect the fiscal year basis, and were obtained from the same source. There are data 
on various receipts available from National Income and Public Accounts (NIPA) of the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce. The website is at http://www.bea.doc.gov. This site also contains 
historical data on federal, state and local receipts, however on a calendar year basis. 
45 The sample mean is computed as the average of the sample of the difference in the series and hence would 
represent the drift parameter in a random walk process of the type  it i it u a R + = ∆ln . Alternatively, we also 
present the average growth rate using the trend regression line given as follows:  it i i it u t g a R + + = ln as was 
computed by Williams et al. When there is no confusion, we would denote the growth rate of revenue-i as gi.   













































All variables are in real 1995 prices
using the GDP Deflator   23 
indicates that all the average growth rates are significant except for the corporate tax and the 
excise tax revenue.
 46 One can observe that the year-on-year fluctuations in corporate tax revenue 
have been most volatile  during the 1950-2000 period rendering its sample average value 
insignificant. Volatility in many of the flows is also apparent from the observed large revenue 
growth and reduction in payments to individuals due to the expansion of economic activity 
(1951-52) and financing defence spending for the Korean War. Moreover, the recession of the 
early 80s caused corporate tax revenue to drop by 33 percent in 1983.
47 The table also shows that 
growth rate of GDP, denoted by Y, over the same period has been very stable, which would 
imply a degree of flexibility of the tax system in absorbing aggregate risks.
48  
 


























GPIT  0.0462  0.069  4.751  -0.096 (71)  0.264 (51)  0.0371  40.63 
GCIT  0.0217  0.151  1.030  -0.328 (83)  0.393 (84)  0.0093  4.34 
GSIC  0.0655  0.055  8.587  -0.007 (76)  0.217 (51)  0.0625  36.42 
GEXT  0.0080  0.095  0.602  -0.185 (82)  0.425 (81)  0.0008  0.54 
GTOT  0.0416  0.061  4.863  -0.079 (71)  0.217 (51)  0.0354  50.26 
G(Y)  0.0349  0.023  10.830  -0.020 (75)  0.108 (51)  0.0333  89.15 
Notes. GPIT: Annual growth rate of the personal income tax revenue; GCIT: Annual growth of 
corporate income tax revenue; GSIC: Annual rate of growth of social insurance tax and contributions; 
GEXT; growth rate of excise tax revenue; GTOT: growth of total tax revenue; G(Y) is the growth rate 
of GDP. The growth rates are computed as the difference in the natural logarithm from year to year. 
All data have been adjusted for inflation using the GDP deflator. 
 
Appendix 2: Co-Integration of Revenue Flows with GDP  
In order to examine if the revenue variables are co-integrated with GDP we estimate (3.2) and apply 
three tests to examine if the two variables are co-integrated. The test are the co-integrating regression 
Durbin Watson test, the augmented (where relevant) Dickey-Fuller test, the unrestricted VAR.
50 We 
find that the personal income tax and the total revenue are co-integrated with GDP. Evidence 
                                                 
46 Although the estimated growth from the trend line is significant for CIT but of a lower value. Notice also the 
reduction in the average growth rates for GRPIT, and GRT that brings more into line with the average growth rate 
of the economy.    
47 The drop occurred in 1983 due to the fiscal year reporting issue otherwise as shown in the corporate profits tax 
liability column this occurred in 1982 which was a recession year. 
48 The above average GDP growth figure is consistent with the findings of Maddison (1991), which clearly reflects 
the secular growth in total factor productivity. 
49 These were estimated by first by Williams et al. for the state governments and were expected that these would be 
highly positively correlated with the long run income elasticity of the tax.  
 
50 The tests used were suggested by Engel and Granger (1987). The CRDW and the augmented Dickey-Fuller are 
considered more powerful tests.   24 
indicates that CIT, SIC, and ET are not co-integrated with GDP.
51 The table below presents the 
results: 
 




































CIT with GDP  0.2845 
(0.06303) 
0.279 0.45  -2.53    22.50 
 
SIC with GDP  1.8871 
(0.03827) 
0.980 0.14  -0.73  24.42 
ET with GDP  0.0201 
(0.03983) 
0.000 0.48  -2.40 
 
6.46 
TOT with GDP  1.0658 
(0.0144) 
0.991 0.96  -4.95 
 
48.84 
Note: The standard errors are reported below the estimated coefficients. The CRDW co-integration test is 
based on the Durbin Watson Statistics with an Ho: D.W.=0. The critical value as reported by Sargan and 
Bhargava based on 10,000 simulations formed from 100 observations at the 5% level of significance is 
D.W. 0.386. Care must be exercised since we have only 50 observations. We use 1% level of significance 
instead of 5% to account for the lower number of observations. The CRDW critical value of is 0.511. On 
the basis of this test only PIT and TOT seem to be co-integrated. The critical value for the co-integration 
test at the 5% is the Dickey-Fuller t-statistics equal to -3.41 based on 50 observations. This is obtained 
from Fuller (1996, Table 10.A.2). Thus we reject Ho of no co-integration if the t-statistics is greater than 
3.41 in absolute terms. From the table all the variables are not co-integrated except total, personal income 
tax revenue with GDP. This augmented Dickey-Fuller test reconfirms the CRDW test. The critical value for 
the unrestricted VAR at the 1% level of significance is 23.4. 
                                                 
51 The absence of co-integration does not imply that a short run relationship does not exists between the two 
variables since differencing makes them stationary and the results cannot be spurious. 
52 The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test did not include a constant term or a time trend in the auxiliary regression. The 
number of lags included in the augmented Dickey-Fuller test are 0 for CIT, 1 for PIT, 0 for SIC, 0 for ET, 1 for SIB, 
1 for TOT, 0 for CRP.       CESifo Working Paper Series
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